The fall of Mosel to ISIS in June, 2014 was not anticipated by the established intelligence experts in the Department of Defense. As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey, stated on PBS Frontline, “There were several things that surprised us about [the Islamic State], the degree to which they were able to form their own coalition both inside of Syria and inside of northwestern Iraq, the military capability they exhibited, the collapse of the Iraqi security forces. Yeah, in those initial days, there were a few surprises.”

While this seems like an amazing admission to many analysts, it really shouldn’t be. It is symptomatic of a broader problem, one that is harder to admit and has been endemic for decades, if not centuries. That problem is establishing self-reporting systems that only encourage and reward reports that indicate progress is being made and fit the established politically correct scenario. It is the proverbial “Light at the end of the tunnel” that keeps drawing in those who willfully disregard facts that are not deemed good news.

During the early phases of the Vietnam conflict it was a consummate manager, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, who emphasized the quantification of war. […]